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Philosophy of Intellect in the Long Commentary 
on the De anima of Averroes 
 
John Shannon Hendrix 
 
 
 
This essay will present an interpretation of the philosophy of intellect of 
Averroes (1126–98) in the Long Commentary on the De anima, by examin-
ing how Averroes expands on the De anima of Aristotle; by evaluating the 
commentaries on Averroes by F. Brentano (1838–1917), P. Merlan (1897–
1968), H. A. Davidson and R. C. Taylor; by suggesting precedents for the 
thought of Averroes in the Enneads of the Neoplatonic philosopher Plotinus 
(204–70); by examining the possible influence of Averroes on the Scholastic 
philosopher Robert Grosseteste (1168–1253); and by suggesting Averroes’ 
concept of material intellect as a predecessor to concepts in Transcendental 
Idealism and Structural Linguistics. 
      Averroes was “an excessive enthusiast of Aristotle,” in the words of 
Franz Brentano, “concerned to develop the latter’s pure doctrine.”1 Never-
theless, his interpretation of Aristotle, considered to be “mystical,” his plac-
ing of the intellects outside the soul, taken to be a rejection of the 
immortality of the individual soul, led Thomas Aquinas to declare: “Non tam 
peripateticus quam peripateticae philosophiae depravator!”2 In his Long 
Commentary on the De anima, Averroes posits three separate intelligences 
functioning in the anima rationalis or the rational soul: agent or active intel-
lect (intellectus agens); material or passible intellect (intellectus materialis, 
intellectus passibilis or intellectus possibilis); and speculative intellect (intel-
lectus speculativus), or actualized or acquired intellect (intellectus adeptus). 
In the De anima 3.1.5,3 “there are three parts of the intellect in the soul; the 
first is the receptive intellect, the second, the active intellect, and the third is 
actual intellection…,” that is, material, agent, and speculative.  
      This is based on Averroes’ interpretation of Aristotle’s De anima 
3.5.430a, 10–15.4 While Aristotle located both material and active intellects 
in the soul, Averroes locates only their functions in the soul, while the intel-
lects themselves are eternal substances.5 Not wanting to be inconsistent with 
Aristotle, thought requires both the activity of the active intellect and the re-
ceptivity of the material intellect, according to Averroes. The result, though, 
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is that the “first principles of thought”6 are given without an act of will, but 
the active intellect can be induced through the active will to illuminate the 
material intellect and images in the imaginative faculty, the formae imagina-
tivae or phantasmata in the imaginatio. The passible intellect of Aristotle 
(De anima 3.5.430a24) is a “sensory power,”7 and Averroes connects it to 
both imagination and cognition (virtus cogitativa), as Franz Brentano ex-
plains in The Psychology of Aristotle. 
      While material intellect is “partly generable and corruptible, partly eter-
nal,” corporeal and incorporeal, the active intellect is purely eternal and in-
corporeal. Active intellect is the final entelechy, or final actualization of 
potentiality. Material intellect is a possible intellect, a possibility, because it 
is both corporeal and incorporeal, thus neither corporeal nor incorporeal, a 
controversial position taken by Averroes which is difficult to rationalize. 
Material intellect becomes actualized intellect, or “energized” intellect in the 
analysis of Philip Merlan in Monopsychism Mysticism Metaconsciousness,8 
through the affect of the agent intellect, which illuminates, as a First Cause, 
the intelligible species, the species apprehensibilis or forma imaginativa, the 
residue of the species sensibilis, the sensation or sensible form, in the anima 
rationalis or soul. The illuminated species apprehensibilis or intelligible acts 
on material intellect until material intellect becomes actualized or energized 
intellect, at which point intellect is able to act on the intelligible. In the 
words of Merlan, “material intelligence becomes transformed into what 
Averroes calls speculative intelligence.” The speculative intelligence of 
Averroes is identical to the productive intelligence of Alexander of Aphrodi-
sias. 
      When the development of the intellectus speculativus is complete, it is 
perfected through active intellect.9 Averroes does not fully explain how the 
two intellects can be connected in this way, beyond the mediating role of the 
imaginative faculty. This problem is explored in detail by Paul Sidney Christ 
in The Psychology of the Active Intellect of Averroes. Averroes fails to rec-
oncile the material (hylic) and active intellects posited by Aristotle. For Plot-
inus and previous commentators on Aristotle, the explanation is given as the 
pneumatic, but this is not given in Averroes. Both material and speculative 
intelligence are seen as being immortal, but the immortality is compromised 
by the perishability of the formae imaginativae in the imaginatio, the mech-
anism by which the material intellect is actualized.10 
      The formae imaginativae, as the basis of actualized intellect, are both 
corporeal and incorporeal; they bridge the gap or merge the two in the proc-
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ess of intellection. The formae imaginativae, like the sensations of which 
they are residues, are partially connected to the material or corporeal, and 
cannot be archetypes from without, but intelligibles within human intellect. 
The affect of active intellect on material intellect toward actualized intellect 
is a combination of the illumination and the resulting mechanisms of intel-
lectus speculativus. The affect is in the combination of the receptivity of ma-
terial intellect as a passive substratum of cognitive and intellectual activity, 
like a blank tablet, and the will or desire on the part of the thinking subject to 
develop cognitive and intellectual virtus. 
      In his De anima (3.7.431b2), Aristotle wrote that the human intellect 
thinks the forms in images. Aristotle compared the active intellect (nous) to 
light itself, in relation to the potential intellect, what can be taken as ratio or 
discursive reason, as “in a sense light makes potential colours into actual 
colours” (3.5.430a10–25).11 Aristotle contrasted the active or productive in-
tellect, nous poietikos, with the potential or passive intellect, nous pa-
thetikos. The active intellect illuminates what is intelligible in the sensible 
world. For Aristotle, phantasia or imagination is not part of intellect; it 
merely supplies intellect with the sensible form, which the intellect illumi-
nates, as light makes potential colors actual, to form the intelligible form in 
active intellect. 
      In the De anima 3.7 of Aristotle, human intellect thinks the form or spe-
cies, and processes it conceptually, as an image, which must be imprinted in 
the imaginative faculty. In 3.4, the sensible object is related to sense percep-
tion as the form of the object is related to intellect, the intelligible form, in 
relation to sensible form as it is imprinted in the imagination through sense 
perception. The intellect is to what is intelligible as sense perception is to 
what is perceptible. The intellect is receptive of the form as an intelligible; it 
must think the form in order to perceive it. An object might be perceived as a 
sensible form alone, but in that way the object would be singular and indi-
vidual, not part of a totality. In De anima 3.4, although the intellect receives 
a form as an imprint in sensation and becomes identical in thought with the 
form, the intellect is not affected or altered in any way by the form or the 
sense object connected with it. 
      The active intellect is “a cause which is productive…” (De anima 
3.5.430a12). According to Aristotle, the intellect is passive in that it becomes 
all things, and active in that it makes all things. In the De anima 
(3.5.430a14–15), Aristotle distinguished between the quality of mind which 
is “what it is by virtue of becoming all things,” and the quality “which is 
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what it is by virtue of making all things,” the making of the actual from the 
potential. In the De anima of Aristotle, “in the individual, potential knowl-
edge is in time prior to actual knowledge” (3.5.430a21–22). The active intel-
lect illuminates the intelligible form in the sensible form (this double 
illumination can also be found in Plotinus), as formed by the imagination or 
phantasia, from the imprint in sense perception (as in Plotinus), which is 
then given to discursive reason, material intellect. Phantasia is composed of 
afterimages of sensations, mnemic residues or traces in the oculus mentis. 
Phantasia, though it is not part of intellect, is necessary for the functioning 
of intellect. 
      In Averroes’ De anima 3.1.5, the existence of intelligibles or first princi-
ples in intellect, as they are understood in actualized intellect, “does not sim-
ply result from the reception of the object,” the sensible form in sense 
perception in material intellect, “but consists in attention to, or perception of, 
the represented forms…,” the cognition of the forms in actualized intellect 
wherein they can be understood as intelligibles, which requires both the par-
ticipation of active intellect and the motivation of the individual for intellec-
tual development. This was also described by Plotinus. The goal of 
intellectual development for Averroes is to achieve union with active intel-
lect, the final entelechy, and through this union the highest bliss in life can 
be achieved. Such bliss can only be achieved “in the eve of life.” 
      Material intellect, in that it is only a possibility, contains neither actual 
intellectual cognition nor a faculty for intellectual cognition. Both of these 
are only possible in actualized intellect, through intellectus speculativus, ac-
quired intellect, and the affect of agent intellect. Material intellect contains 
only the possibility of being united with active intellect; all material intel-
lects are equally potential. While they are all part of “the single transcendent 
material intellect shared by all human beings,”12 as described by Richard C. 
Taylor, the power of the material intellect in Averroes’ thought  should not 
be overestimated. Intellectus speculativus is developed as the oculus mentis 
of the anima rationalis develops a vocabulary of images or phantasmata 
stored in the imaginatio or phantasia. The phantasm is corporeal, and poten-
tially intelligible, as the material intellect has the potential to understand the 
intelligible. The sensible form can only potentially be an intelligible form if 
it is predetermined by the intelligible form. In the De anima 3.5.36,13 “this 
sort of action,” of the active intellect, “which consists in generating intelligi-
bles and actualizing them, exists in us prior to the action of the intellect,” 
prior to the formation of the perceived form in imaginatio. The corporeal 
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condition of material intellect acts as a substrate for actualized and agent in-
tellect, the partially and completely incorporeal, only as a blank tablet on 
which letters are written. The corporeal presence of the letters, the sensible 
forms in phantasia, is predetermined by the writing of the letters, based on 
the idea of the letter, the intelligible form, which pre-exists the letter itself. 
      The material intellect alone for Averroes differentiates the human being 
from other animals, not in its potential for intellect but in its sensory powers, 
the intellectus passibilis of Aristotle. The intellectus passibilis is able to dis-
tinguish and compare individual sensory representations in the virtus aesti-
mativa or virtus cogitativa, which provides the material substrate for 
intellectus speculativus. The virtus aestimativa or virtus cogitativa might al-
so be ascribed to the sensus communis, common sense; they are both “per-
ishable body powers”14 as described by Taylor. In distinguishing and 
comparing the phantasmata in imaginatio, intellect applies shape and form 
to otherwise nebulous, inchoate images. It also organizes them in totalities, 
in the most rudimentary processes of abstraction, and defines them in rela-
tion to organizational systems, such as geometry and mathematics. This is 
also described by Plotinus. Averroes suggests that the sensory powers them-
selves entail an element of intellection, in that the imprint of the sensible 
form would depend on the formation of the intelligible form. 
      In the De anima 3.1.7,15 “the cogitative faculty,” virtus cogitativa, “be-
longs to the genus of sensible faculties. But the imaginative and the cogita-
tive and the recollective” faculties, imaginatio, ratio and memoria, “all 
cooperate in producing the image of the sensible thing,” the species sensibi-
lis, “so that the separate rational faculty can perceive it,” as a reflected image 
in the oculus mentis, “and extract the universal intention,” the intelligible, 
“and finally receive, i.e., comprehend it.” In the words of Brentano, “Once 
they have done this, and once the activity of the active intellect has made the 
images intelligible, the material intellect, which stands to all intelligible 
forms in the relation of potentiality, receives from the images the concepts of 
sensible things.”16 
      The form and shape which intellect imposes on bodies are mechanisms 
of intellect in sense perception, as in Plotinus. As Averroes explains in the 
De anima 3.1.5,17 “It is necessary to assign two subjects to these actually ex-
isting intelligibles,” the intelligible as it exists in the form of the sensory ob-
ject, “one of which is the subject due to which the intelligibles are true, i.e., 
forms, which are truthful images,” sensible forms; “the other, the subject due 
to which the intelligibles are only a single one of the entities in the world, 
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and this is the material intellect itself.” The intellect of the perceiving subject 
in sensory perception is as responsible for how the sensible world is per-
ceived as the forms which are assigned to the sensible world.  
      The Long Commentary contains Averroes’ fullest account of the relation 
between active and material intellect.18 The sensible form in the oculus men-
tis exists as a potential intelligible, and the material intellect, which is en-
gaged in the formation of the sensible form, is capable of receiving the 
intelligible from the active intellect. The active intellect makes what is po-
tentially intelligible, actually intelligible. The material intellect is the passi-
ble intellect, intellectus passibilis, described by Aristotle in his De anima 
(3.5.430a24), which distinguishes and compares the individual representa-
tions of sense experience in the oculus mentis. Averroes also calls the passi-
ble intellect virtus aestimativa (a term used by Avicenna), and virtus 
cogitativa (a term used by Grosseteste). The intellectus passibilis should be 
distinguished from the virtus aestimativa naturalis, which is judgment by 
natural instinct, and can be found in all animals.  
      Averroes compares intellectus passibilis to phantasia or imaginatio, in 
De anima 3.1.20,19 the image-making virtus or power of intellect in the for-
mation of the phatasmata. Following Aristotle, Averroes divides material 
intellect into the sensus communis, or sense perception, the phantasia, the 
virtus cogitativa, and memoria, in ascending order from corporeal to spiri-
tual, as the active intellect is increasingly engaged. The material intellect 
cannot distinguish or apprehend intelligibles on its own. The material, passi-
ble intellect, becomes an acquired intellect, through the activities of 
phantasia and memoria, and it is based in the acquisition of habitual 
knowledge through exercise, intellectus in habitu, as a material intellectus 
speculativus. The passible intellect operates according to its capacity for 
receptivity, not according to an ability to form concepts or abstractions. 
      Intellectual knowledge for Averroes must be distinguished from the ha-
bitual knowledge of passible intellect. Intellectual knowledge is the product 
of the merging of the material intellect, which is considered to be incorpo-
real, despite its dependence on the sensible, and the active intellect, which 
transforms the sensible form into the intelligible form, stripping it of its cor-
poreal attachment and converting it from a particular to a universal, which 
makes the potentially intelligible phantasmata in the oculus mentis intelligi-
ble. The intellectus agens is the intellect which acts, which moves the mate-
rial intellect, the intellect which only receives or is affected, as described in 
De anima 3.1.5. The active intellect allows the material intellect to be moved 
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by imagination. The intellectus passibilis, as virtus cogitativa in combination 
with phantasia and memoria, forms the phantasm in order that it can be per-
ceived by the active intellect, and prepares it to receive the active intellect, 
by which the sensible becomes the intelligible, which can be comprehended 
as a universal. 
      In the De anima of Averroes, the transformation from potentiality to ac-
tuality takes place in the speculative intellect, which includes the intellectus 
in habitu, and is distinguished from the agent or productive intellect, intel-
lectus agens, and the material or passible intellect, intellectus passibilis.20 
The actualizing of the material intellect by the productive intellect is the re-
sult of the productive intellect illuminating the residues of sensations exist-
ing in the mind, the formae imaginativae, or mnemic resides. The formae act 
on the material intellect after they have been illuminated, and material intel-
lect is transformed into speculative intellect, which combines the material 
and productive intellects, the physical and eternal or archetypal, corporeal 
and incorporeal.       
      Averroes describes the material intellect as the transparent medium in 
relation to the active intellect, as light. In the relation between nous and dis-
cursive reason, the activity of the intellectus agens must precede that of the 
intellectus materialis. In the material intellect, individual representations are 
distinguished, in the virtus aestimativa naturalis. The material form is seen 
as color in relation to the light, resulting from the intentio in the imaginative 
faculty, or phantasia. In other words, as Averroes says in De anima 3.3.18, 21 
“the relation of the intentions in imagination to the material intellect is the 
same as the relation of the sensible to the senses.” The material intellect re-
ceives the active intellect in the same way that transparent bodies “receive 
light and colors at the same time; the light, however, brings forth the colors” 
(De anima 3.5.36).22 The intelligible form results from the cooperation of the 
material and active intellects. The active intellect “illuminates both the mate-
rial intellect and images in the imaginative faculty of the soul,”23 in the 
words of Davidson, an illumination induced through the exercise of the will.   
      For Averroes, light is the entelechy (entelecheia, actualization or perfec-
tio) of the transparent medium, just as the active intellect is the entelechy of 
material intellect. Averroes follows Alfarabi in his explanation of light, but 
fails to distinguish between light and the source of light.24 This nevertheless 
results in a new interpretation of light as entelechy on the part of Averroes, 
based on his interpretation of Aristotle. The transparent is not affected by 
color in any way unless it is illuminated, just as discursive reason is not af-
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fected in any way by intelligibles unless it is illuminated and perfected by 
the active intellect, the higher intellect or nous. When the material intellect is 
perfected by the agent intellect it is joined to it as an adeptio or acquisition, 
and the combination becomes intellectus adeptus or acquired intellect. 
Averroes sees the material intellect as a medium rather than an organ, ena-
bling consciousness of intelligible thoughts, through the illumination of the 
formae imaginativae in the imaginatio.25 The same function of phantasia 
was described by Plotinus. 
      Once the combination of the material intellect and the active intellect has 
formed the species apprehensibilis and allowed the virtus cogitativa to ap-
prehend the intelligible, the concept and universal are able to play a role in 
cogitation. As Averroes says in De anima 3.3.18, when “the relation of the 
intentions in imagination to the material intellect is the same as the relation 
of the sensible to the senses, as Aristotle says, it is necessary to assume an-
other mover which makes them actually move the material intellect, and this 
simply means that it makes actual thoughts by separating them from matter.” 
The intellectus adeptus produces the intelligible form when the sensus com-
munis, virtus cogitativa and imaginatio in the nous hylikos establish a foun-
dation in cooperation to provide material for the intellectus adeptus, which it 
then processes in relation to the active intellect. The intelligible form is a hy-
brid of the universal concept which is the product of the active intellect,  and 
the sensible form, which is the product of sense perception and imaginatio. 
The intelligible form unites the virtus cogitativa with the active intellect, and 
sense perception with intellection.  
      The material intellect, virtus cogitativa, in that it is tied to the particulars 
of sense perception, is a singular entity in each individual, and cannot pro-
duce meaning or communication, cannot unite the cognitive faculties of each 
individual. The active intellect, on the other hand, in that it is capable of 
formulating intelligibles, which are incorporeal and not tied to the materials 
of individual sense perception, is able to unite particular individuals engag-
ing in cognition in order to create a shared intellection which produces 
communication and meaning. This is sometimes referred to as “monopsy-
chism,” and is also a basic proposition of Structural Linguistics in the twen-
tieth century. In De anima 3.1.5,26 “And since it has already been shown that 
the intellect cannot unite with all individuals by multiplying according to 
their number with respect to that part that is the opposite of intellect qua 
form,” material intellect, “the only thing that remains is that this intellect 
unites with all of us through the union with us of concepts or intentions pre-
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sent to the mind…”. While the operation of the virtus cogitativa is particular 
to each individual, the intelligible form, which it receives from the active in-
tellect, is universal and shared by every individual, as it is retained as a per-
manent archetype in intellection.       
      When the intelligible is received by the material intellect, it is subject to 
generation and corruption, multiplicity and accident. The intelligible form, 
when it is connected to the sensible form in material intellect, is not a per-
manent mnemic residue as an archetype, but is fluctuating and impermanent 
in its corporeal manifestation. But the intelligible form does not disappear 
when its corresponding sensible form does, it merely ceases to participate in 
the sensible form. In De anima 3.1.5,27 “And if intelligibles of this kind are 
considered, insofar as they have being simpliciter and not in respect of some 
individual,” as universals, “then it must truly be said of them that they have 
eternal being, and that they are not sometimes intelligibles and sometimes 
not, but that they always exist in the same manner…”. The intelligible form 
can participate in the sensible form, of its own volition, or the volition of the 
active intellect, but the sensible form cannot participate in the intelligible 
form, in its corporeal limitations, in the same way that color, for example, 
because it is tied to the corporeal body, cannot participate in light, although 
they are perceived simultaneously and are undifferentiated in perception.  
      Just because the sensible form is no longer visible in the oculus mentis 
does not mean that the intelligible form that is attached to it ceases to exist. 
The material intellect, in that it is part incorporeal and eternal, also always 
has the potential to understand the intelligible, the abstract concept. Whether 
it does or not depends on the degree of union with active intellect and the 
degree of development of virtus, not on the level of potentiality. Material in-
tellect is also always thinking; it is not capable of not thinking, which shows 
the presence of the eternal in it. 
      The material intellect of every individual is capable of receiving the in-
telligible form; individual material intellects receive intelligibles to varying 
degrees, depending on the extent to which the individual aspires to intelligi-
ble knowledge. It is not that the material intellect is not always thinking and 
does not always have the potential to receive intelligibles, it is just that it is 
not always united with active intellect. It is through the perfected union be-
tween the material intellect and the active intellect that intelligibles are ap-
prehended, and that a beatific state can be achieved by the most complete 
apprehension of them as possible. Intelligibles come to material intellect 
naturally as first principles, as in the proten entelecheian of Aristotle, the 
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first entelechy, but any further intelligibles derived from the first principles 
require the volition of the material intellect. In De anima 3.5.36,28 all indi-
vidual material intellects are capable of receiving intelligibles naturally; the 
active intellect “is combined with us potentially whenever the speculative 
intelligibles are potentially present within us…”.  
      All individual material intellects are capable of some ability to form con-
cepts and abstract ideas at a basic level, but beyond that intellectual devel-
opment varies among individuals according to the level of volition (what 
Grosseteste would call solertia). The emphasis on individual will is a key 
element of Averroes’ thought. Intelligibles are apprehended the more com-
pletely as knowledge of the material world is greater, according to Averroes, 
as knowledge of sensible objects depends on knowledge of intelligibles. 
Complete knowledge of the material world results in complete unity between 
the material intellect and the active intellect, the final entelechy achieved in 
the “eve of life.”  
      Such an entelechy is the result of the process of active intellect combin-
ing “with us through conjoining the speculative intelligibles,” in the union of 
the sensible and intelligible, in stages of potentiality and actuality. The final 
entelechy requires actuality, in actualized intellect, intellectus adeptus, rather 
than potentiality, in material intellect, so the great mass of potentiality which 
defines the substratum of human material intellect must be overcome to a 
great degree, and takes a long time, an entire life. The reason why material 
intellect is only united with active intellect at the end, and not the beginning, 
is that “potency is part of us so long as there is in us form that exists only po-
tentially,” which could be seen as an infinity. Knowledge and understanding 
are possible only in actualized intellect, which must no longer be potential 
intellect. Intellectual knowledge, and philosophy itself, which is eternal, as 
an intelligible, must be seen as the ultimate goal of human life, and the cause 
of the most perfect bliss. 
      Aristotle, in his De anima, defined light as a transparent medium. For 
Averroes, the material intellect receives intelligible thoughts as the transpar-
ent medium receives colors through illumination. As light makes colors visi-
ble to the eye, so light makes intelligibles understandable to the material 
intellect, discursive reason, resulting in abstract thoughts and concepts. 
Averroes sees the material intellect as a medium, as light is in the sensible 
world, an eternal substance independent of the mechanisms of the senses, as 
much as the active intellect. In the De anima of Averroes, intellect must be 
defined as unmixed, in particular as unmixed with the particulars of sense 
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experience and sense knowledge. Material intellect is not altered in any way 
by the reception of intellect, because, though it is connected to the body, it is 
not a body itself; it is more of a blank slate, as for Aristotle in De anima 
3.4.429b30–430a10, the forms of thought “must be in it just as characters 
may be said to be on a writing-tablet on which as yet nothing actually stands 
written…”; material intellect is thus the “place of forms” as described by Ar-
istotle in De anima 3.4.429a27–28. 
      For Averroes, following Aristotle, it is necessary that the material or re-
ceiving intellect be unmixed so that it can receive and understand all things. 
If material intellect were a form itself, then it could not receive a form. Mate-
rial intellect is activated to the extent to which it is able to understand the 
forms of things which exist in actuality outside the rational soul, or the po-
tential for thought. The rational soul, anima rationalis, considers the forms 
or intentiones which are in the imaginative faculty, and material intellect is 
activated in its process of abstracting forms from material things and creat-
ing first intelligibles, intelligibles in actuality derived from potentials in po-
tentiality; in that way, intellect goes from being passive to being active. 
When intellect is moved by intelligibles, it is passive, but when intellect 
comes to move intelligibles, it is active; thus the anima rationalis consists of 
two distinct powers, the passive and active. Both powers are unmixed, in-
corporeal, neither generable nor corruptible.  
      In the De anima 3.5.3629 of Averroes, “there are formed in the soul of 
man two parts of the intellect, one being that which receives,” and “another 
being that which acts,” the former being the material intellect, the latter be-
ing the actualized intellect, which “makes it the case that the intentions and 
concepts existing in the faculty of imagination,” as connected to the phan-
tasmata in imaginatio, which are illuminated by active intellect, “actually 
move the material intellect, while previously they moved it only poten-
tially…”. Further, “those two parts are neither generated nor corruptible” as 
corporeal, and “the relation of the active to the receptive intellect is just like 
the relation of form to matter.” The sensible impression, or phantasma, thus 
acts on matter in sense perception in material intellect, in the virtus aestima-
tiva or virtus cogitativa, dianoia. Further, in the De anima 3.5.36,30 there are 
“two modes of action” in intellect, “one of which belongs to the genus of af-
fections” in material intellect, the other belonging to “the genus of actions” 
in actualized intellect, “whose function it is to abstract the forms and to strip 
them of matter, which is nothing other than making them into actual intelli-
gibles, while previously they were only potential intelligibles,” the sensible 
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form made known as the intelligible form. 
      For Averroes, the species must be transformed in order for it to be re-
ceived by material intellect, as in the Liber Naturalis of Avicenna; it must be 
differentiated as an intelligible in potentiality as opposed to an intelligible in 
actuality. Material intellect is not corporeal, in that it is capable of receiving 
corporeal forms, though it must be connected to the corporeal. As Taylor ex-
plains, “it is not possible for the material intellect itself to be a particular or 
definite individual entity, since the received intelligible would be contracted 
to the particular nature of its subject, the material intellect.”31 At the same 
time, material intellect cannot be composed of forms, in that it is capable of 
receiving sensible forms. Material intellect is thus neither matter nor simple 
form, form separable from body. It is capable of receiving the sensible form, 
and it is capable of producing the intelligible form, but it is neither matter 
nor intelligible itself, but rather an indefinable substrate for both.  
      Material intellect must be defined as being something in between the 
corporeal and incorporeal, as the mechanism which can connect the two. 
Material intellect cannot be seen to contain anything similar to the species or 
form which it is capable of receiving, but it can be seen to contain something 
similar to the genus of the species which it receives, and to the predication of 
the species which it receives. In other words, there must be a predisposition 
of the material intellect, while it is a power separate from the body, and has 
no material form which allows it to receive the sensible form, which is the a 
priori existence of the intelligible form which governs the perception of the 
sensible form and its transformation into an intelligible form in the process 
of abstraction and conceptualization in actualized or acquired intellect. 
      Averroes concludes that material intellect can only be defined as a possi-
bility, as Aristotle said that it has only the nature of the possibility for receiv-
ing the intelligible forms, and that before it thinks, it does not exist. The 
material intelligible form, a seeming contradiction in terms, can only exist if 
the sensible form is seen as a manifestation of the intelligible form, or the 
intelligible form is seen as a precondition of the material form, and the mate-
rial form does not exist outside of its conception based on the intelligible 
form. The material intelligible form, or universal material form, exists only 
as a potential concept, which is material intellect, which is potentially all of 
the concepts of universal material forms, and the material intelligible form 
exists only as actuality when it is understood by intellect. 
      Material intellect is capable of receiving universal forms, intelligibles, 
because of its partial separation from the corporeal, which contains only dif-
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ferentiated forms, the particulars of sense perception, as also explained by 
Plotinus and Grosseteste. For Averroes, material intellect is not corporeal 
because it can distinguish between sensible particulars and universal forms; 
if it were corporeal it would not be able to do so, it would only be able to re-
ceive forms as differentiated and particular. As material intelligible forms, or 
universal material forms, exist in material intellect, they exist as speculative 
intelligibles which are generable and corruptible, subject to the mechanisms 
of intellect. This is possible because there must be a cause of the generation 
of the speculative intelligibles, something which allows material intellect to 
bridge the corporeal and incorporeal.  
 
Averroes and Plotinus 
 
Though Averroes is not generally considered to be sympathetic to Neopla-
tonic thinking, there are definite parallels between the philosophies of intel-
lect of Averroes and Plotinus. Both can be considered to be “Idealists” in 
that intelligible form precedes sensible form in perception, and that the mate-
rial intellect of Averroes or discursive reason of Plotinus, nous hylikos or pa-
thetikos, depends in its functioning on the agent intellect of Averroes or 
Intellectual Principle of Plotinus, nous poietikos. The formation of the image 
in the oculus mentis is coincident with the formation of a thought, and the 
sensible form is a transient residue of the permanent intelligible form, as if it 
is reflected in a mirror and projected on a surface. For both philosophers, 
material intellect and intellect not connected to sense perception are medi-
ated by a kind of intellectus in habitu (intellectus speculativus), a practicing 
intellect which leads the individual to higher forms of understanding. The 
development of phantasmata or imprints of forms in the oculus mentis in the 
imagination or phantasia is the product of a dialectical relation between the 
mechanisms of sense perception in material intellect and an a priori under-
standing of forms in the intelligible, prior to the sensible. In order to be per-
ceived, forms must be constructed, in a structuring of reality. For both 
Plotinus and Averroes, the formae imaginativae or phantasmata in the 
imaginatio are the mechanisms by which material intellect or dianoia is ac-
tualized by agent intellect or nous. 
      In the Enneads of Plotinus, I.6.3,32 shape is not something which is in-
herent to objects in sensual reality, but is rather something which is imposed 
upon objects by human thought, in the nature of geometry and ordering prin-
ciples. The sensible form given by the material intellect connected to sense 
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perception is already a product of intellection. The shape of the impression 
of the form of the object in Plotinus is something conceived, and joined to 
the material object before it is received as an impression; the shape of the ob-
ject is part of the a priori vocabulary by which intellect orders the sensual 
world, and reaffirms the existence of the perceiving subject in the world. For 
Plotinus, “When sense-perception, then, sees the form in bodies binding and 
mastering the nature opposed to it, which is shapeless, and shape riding glo-
riously upon other shapes, it gathers into one that which appears dispersed 
and brings it back and takes it in, now without parts, to the soul’s interior 
and presents to it that which is within as something in tune with it…”. As for 
Averroes, the form and shape which intellect imposes on bodies are mecha-
nisms of intellect in sense perception.       
      Sense perception transfers the form of the body or material entity, as 
conceptualized, according to Plotinus, “now without parts” (Enneads I.6.3); 
the perceived form must correspond to the preconception of it, the intelligi-
ble form. Dianoia or discursive reason, actualized material intellect, de-
scribed as “the reasoning power in soul” in Enneads V.3.2, makes judgments 
about the sensible form given to it, which is already the product of judg-
ments of the higher intellect, the Intellectual Principle, nous poietikos, the 
presence of active intellect in actualized intellect, and organizes them in 
combinations and divisions, corresponding to the principles of geometry and 
mathematics. As the phantasmata or imprints of forms come to reasoning 
power from intellect, “as for the things which come to it from Intellect, it ob-
serves what one might call their imprints…and it continues to acquire under-
standing as if by recognizing the new and recently arrived impressions and 
fitting them to those which have long been within it,” in “recollections of the 
soul,” according to Plotinus, as in an actualized intellect or intellectus in 
habitu. Perception is the product of experience in the interaction of thought 
and the sensible world, the dialectic of the incorporeal and corporeal, the 
universal and particular.      
      In Enneads V.3.3, if sense perception is to make the details of form ex-
plicit, “it is taking to pieces what the image-making power gave it,” and if it 
makes a judgment on the form, “its remark originates in what it knows 
through sense-perception, but what it says about this it has already from it-
self…”. Discursive reason in material intellect does nothing other than proc-
ess images of forms which it has already defined itself, through the relation 
between active intellect and material intellect, Intellectual Principle and dis-
cursive reason. Without the capacity to understand the intelligible, the intel-
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ligible form in relation to the sensible form, material intellect can only be 
unaware of the reality of the sensible world which is perceived, and unaware 
of the role that it plays in the formation and definition of the sensible world 
which it perceives as external to itself.  
      For Plotinus there can be no immediate sense perception of an object, 
without the mediation of the mirror reflection of the intelligible form of the 
object in intellect, the forma imaginativa of Averroes. In Enneads I.1.8, the 
intelligible form in intellect becomes the sensible form in sense perception, 
“not of itself and body, but abiding itself and giving images of itself, like a 
face seen in many mirrors,” in the same way that active intellect presents the 
intelligible to acquired intellect. Acquired intellect is only capable of receiv-
ing the intelligible to the extent of its limitations, as differentiated or sequen-
tially arranged, in the same way that the mirror is only capable of receiving 
an image according to its corporeal state, adjusted in size and position. 
      The discerning of impressions printed upon the intellect by sensation for 
Plotinus is the function of discursive reason, not immediate sense perception. 
Since the sensual impressions in perception are copies and derivatives of in-
telligible forms, perception itself is a copy and derivative of reason. Reason 
in Plotinus is composed of mnemic residues of perceived objects, what Plot-
inus calls “imprints” in “recollections” in Enneads V.3.2. Thoughts are pro-
pelled by the desire created by the multiple and fragmented images of 
perception as reconstructed in reason. In Enneads IV.7.6, sense perceptions 
merge together in reason like lines coming together from the circumference 
of the circle, from multiplicity to unity, subject to the ruling principles. In 
reality, sense objects are variable and differentiated in terms of size and loca-
tion; they are multiple and fragmented, and it is only the reason of the per-
ceiver which allows them to be apprehended as whole and congruent. Sense 
objects themselves cannot be immediately perceived as a congruent whole. 
Once the diverse and multiple sense objects have been transformed into a 
whole by apprehension in sense perception, they cannot return to their origi-
nal state. Apprehension permanently transforms sensual reality in confor-
mance with the principles of reason.  
      Perception, according to Plotinus, divides, multiplies, and otherwise or-
ganizes sensual reality; in other words, perception is an intellective process. 
Perceived objects are divided and organized into parts which correspond di-
rectly to the organizational capacities of reason. The relation of parts and 
subdivisions to the whole and to infinity is the same in the sense object as it 
is in reasoning capacity. Geometry and mathematics are mechanisms by 
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which sensual reality is represented by perception to reason, though sense 
objects do not inherently contain geometrical and mathematical properties.  
      For Plotinus, discursive reason approaches nous, as material intellect ap-
proaches active intellect for Averroes, when reason recognizes its recent 
sense impressions and “gathers into one that which appears dispersed and 
brings it back and takes it in, now without parts,” the mnemic residue or 
memory trace of previous sense impressions, in a process of reminiscence. In 
the Enneads, while perception grasps the “impressions produced by sensation 
on the living being” (I.1.7), through the mnemic residue, a perception is “a 
mental image for that which is going to remember it” (IV.3.29), and the 
“memory and the retention of the object” belong to the “image-making pow-
er” or the imagination or phantasia. In the representation in the mnemic resi-
due, the intelligible form is present after the sensible form or perception is 
gone, as for Averroes. Through memory, “an image accompanies every men-
tal act,” as described in Enneads IV.3.30. Through the intelligible form the 
intellectual act is without parts and has not come out into the open, but re-
mains unobserved within, unknown to reason, suggesting the “unconscious” 
element of thought for which Plotinus is known, and which plays a role in 
the philosophy of Averroes. 
 
Averroes and Grosseteste 
 
Robert Grosseteste is believed to have known the Long Commentary of 
Averroes, translated into Latin c. 1220, as evidenced in works by Grosseteste 
such as the Commentary on the Posterior Analytics (c. 1230), and the 
Hexaëmeron (On the Six Days of Creation, 1237), written shortly before or at 
the time Grosseteste became Bishop of Lincoln.33 In the Hexaëmeron (VIII, 
IV, 7),34 the sensible form or species sensibilis is given by the intelligible 
form or species apprehensibilis, which is formed in the imagination or phan-
tasia and is presented to discursive reason in the process of perception. The 
active intellect illuminates the species apprehensibilis, what is intelligible in 
the species, in the species sensibilis as formed by the phantasia or imagina-
tio, from the imprint in sense perception, which is then given to passive intel-
lect. The species apprehensibilis is a similitude of the species sensibilis, as a 
mnemic residue, and is thus a representation of the species sensibilis, which 
is itself a representation of the object to which its form corresponds 
(Hexaëmeron VIII, IV, 9–10). 
      In his Commentary on the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle (I.14, 235–
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38),35 Grosseteste compares (but does not equate) intelligentia, divine intel-
lect, to the intellectus agens, agent intellect, or actio intellectus, active intel-
lect, the intellect which is differentiated from the passive, material intellect, 
in the De anima of Aristotle. Like the actio intellectus of Aristotle, the intel-
ligentia of Grosseteste illuminates the lower functions of intellect, virtus 
cogitativa and intellectus in habitu, as described by Averroes in the Long 
Commentary. The mediating factor suggested by Averroes in the De anima 
of the intellectus adeptus or speculativus, between the active and material in-
tellects, is not developed by Grosseteste, as it was by Averroes. 
      In the Commentary on the Posterior Analytics (II.6.17–21), universals 
(principia) exist in intellect potentially, and are activated to actuality, as in 
the De anima of Aristotle the potential, material intellect is activated by the 
intellectus agens (what Grosseteste calls the virtus intellectiva). For Gros-
seteste, sense knowledge plays a role in the activation of the material intel-
lect. Sense perception is not the cause of knowledge, but rather is the 
condition by which knowledge is possible (I.18, 133–34). As in Aristotle, 
Plotinus and Averroes, reason, virtus cogitativa or virtus scitiva, apprehends 
the intelligible form as a singular or individual, while the virtus intellectiva, 
actio intellectus or intellectus agens, illuminated by intelligentia, apprehends 
the intelligible in its totality, as universal knowledge (I.18, 136, 164–65). 
      For Grosseteste, the active intellect is identified as the virtus intellectiva 
in combination with the intelligentia. Grosseteste follows Averroes as seeing 
the intelligible form, species apprehensibilis, formed by the virtus intellec-
tiva in combination with the intelligentia (as active intellect). In Grosseteste 
the virtus cogitativa plays less of a role in the formation of the intelligible, 
given the irradiatio spiritualis of the intelligentia, reflecting the influence of 
Neoplatonic illumination theory in the interpretation of the Aristotelian doc-
trine. In the Enneads (V.3.8), “And this light shining in the soul illuminates 
it; that is, it makes it intelligent; that is, it makes it like itself, the light 
above.” In the Commentary on the Posterior Analytics, the lux spiritualis 
“floods over intelligible objects (res intelligibiles),” and “over the mind’s eye 
(oculus mentis),” and “stands to the interior eye (oculus interior) and to intel-
ligible objects as the corporeal sun stands to the bodily eye and to visible 
corporeal objects” (I.17, 39–42),36 following Aristotle, Plotinus and 
Averroes. For Grosseteste, the lumen spiritualis, light produced by the lux 
spiritualis, allows the mental sight, the visus mentalis, to apprehend the intel-
ligible in the virtus intellectiva, as the light of the sun, the lumen solare, 
makes vision possible. The lumen spiritualis is the “first visible” in interior 
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sight, visus interior, as the colored body is the first thing receptive of the 
light of the sun, recalling Aristotle and Averroes. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Averroes, in the Long Commentary on the De anima, displays a connection 
to the thought of Plotinus, perhaps as filtered through the Theology of Aris-
totle or the Fons Vitae of Avicebron (Solomon Ibn Gabirol; translated by 
John Avendeath and Domenicus Gundissalinus, Canon of Segovia, c. 1150). 
The theory of knowledge by illumination promoted by Averroes is 
influenced by Neoplatonism; a similar view can be found in the Fons Vitae, 
the De anima of Gundissalinus, and the De intellectu of Alexander of 
Aphrodisias (who was known to have influenced Plotinus). Avicebron 
described the active intellect as a transcendent and incorporeal, cosmic 
intellect, illuminating the anima rationalis. Averroes suggests a kind of 
world soul in which individual souls participate, something also promoted by 
Plotinus.        Subsequently, Averroes influenced the thinking of Latin scholastics in 
the concept of the active intellect as the incorporeal agent leading the poten-
tial, material intellect to actuality, a concept also found in Alexander of Aph-
rodisias and Avicebron. Robert Grosseteste may have also been influenced 
by the Theology of Aristotle or the Fons Vitae. According to Roger Bacon, 
Adam Marsh accepted the incorporeal active intellect as a divine intellect, as 
did Robert Grosseteste, who distinguished a divine or cosmic intellect, intel-
ligentia, from an agent intellect, virtus intellectiva, which actualizes a mate-
rial intellect, virtus cogitativa or virtus scitiva. This distinction can be found 
in the writings of Roger Bacon, Albertus Magnus, and John Peckham. These 
three writers, along with Grosseteste, Adam Marsh, and William of Au-
vergne, also see the divine intellect, the intelligentia, as illuminating the an-
ima rationalis, in the irradiatio spiritualis of the lumen spiritualis, reflected 
spiritual light, in the synthesis of Aristotelian and Neoplatonic influences an-
ticipated by Averroes.  
      Brentano and Merlan characterize Averroes as a mystic. Averroes ex-
pounds “eccentric mysticism” according to Brentano,37 and a “neo-
Aristotelian counterpart of the unio mystica,” which can be seen as rationalis-
tic mysticism, involving a “flood of sheer light” and “absolute transparency” 
in intellect, according to Merlan.38 But as Davidson points out, Averroes re-
jected the idea propagated by Avicenna that scientific knowledge can be at-
tained through prophecy without following scientific procedures. For 
19 
 
Averroes, the three forms of prophecy, dreams, clairvoyance and revelation, 
are products of active intellect. Revelation and prophecy cannot be compared 
to reason as forms of scientific knowledge, a very un-mystical approach for a 
medieval philosopher. Ascension to active intellect in Averroes should be 
seen as a higher functioning of human intellect towards a unitary thought 
with universal laws governing the physical world, communicated by emana-
tion, rather than as the mystical ecstasy as characterized by Merlan. The sug-
gestion of the mystical aspect obscures the importance of Averroes’ 
rationalistic philosophy of intellect, a philosophy which lays foundations for 
Scholastics to Idealists to twentieth-century Structural Linguistics. 
      The dialectic of the material and active intellects, between the individual 
particulars of sense experience in the intellectus passibilis and the universal 
matrix into which they are inserted and actualized, to participate in intellect, 
plays a role in the Vorstellung (picture thinking) of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 
Hegel in the Phenomenology of Spirit, and the concept of la langue (the ma-
trix of rules that govern language in synchronic linguistics) in the Course in 
General Linguistics of Ferdinand de Saussure. For example, in the Phenome-
nology, Vorstellung is the “synthetic combination of sensuous immediacy 
and its universality or Thought.”39 According to Saussure, “synchronic lin-
guistics will be concerned with the logical and psychological relations that 
bind together coexisting terms and form a system in the collective mind of 
the speakers…” (la langue).40 Echoes of Averroes can be heard in both of 
these concepts. 
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